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Tiivistelmä 
Viimeaikaiset laajaa julkisuutta saaneet haavoittuvuudet kriittisissä tietoteknisten jär-
jestelmien komponenteissa aiheuttavat merkittävän riskin tietojärjestelmien toiminnalle. 
Yleiseen tietoon tulevien haavoittuvuuksien osalta korjauspäivitykset ovat useimmiten 
saatavilla. Jäljelle jäävät kysymykset koskevat siis sitä, kuinka saada tieto päivitysten 
julkaisemisesta, kuinka päivitykset asennetaan järkevässä ajassa ja kuinka varmistua päivi-
tysten asentumisesta. Usein vastauksena toimii päivitysten hallintajärjestelmä.
Useita jakeluversioita käsittävien Linux-ympäristöjen osalta ei ole olemassa vakiintunutta 
tapaa ottaa käyttöön järjestelmä päivitysten hallintaa varten. Tavoitteena oli tutkia erilaisia 
tapoja hallintajärjestelmän käyttöönottoon ja valita niistä toimeksiantajan kriteereihin 
parhaiten sopiva toteutus. Toisena tavoitteena oli tarjota suurelle yleisölle tietoa eri 
tavoista päivitysten hallintaan Linux-ympäristöissä. Kolme erilaista esimerkkitoteutusta 
otettiin käyttöön testiympäristössä. Eri toteutustapoja tutkittiin ja verrattiin muihin. Ensim-
mäisenä toteutustapana toimi täysin itse kehitetty järjestelmä, toisena yleisten asetusten-
hallintatyökalujen käyttöön perustuva järjestelmä ja kolmantena nimenomaan päivitysten 
hallintaan tarkoitettu järjestelmä.
Tutkimus onnistui ja jokaisella tutkitulla toteutusvaihtoehdolla saatiin otettua käyttöön 
mekanismi päivitysten hallintaan. Vaihtoehdoista saatiin kerättyä hyödyllistä tietoa, niiden 
hyviä ja huonoja puolia punnittiin ja toimeksiantajan vaatimusten perusteella saatiin aikaan
suositus toteutettavasta järjestelmästä. Myös yleistä tietoa ja suosituksia eri järjestelmien 
soveltuvuudesta erilaisiin ympäristöihin saatiin tuotettua.
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41   Introduction
1.1 Assigner
The thesis assigner Maatalouden Laskentakeskus Oy (MLOY, Agricultural Data Pro-
cessing Centre Ltd.) is a leading software and IT solutions provider in the Finnish agri-
cultural sector. Located in Vantaa, MLOY employs approximately 110 people and has 
a revenue of over EUR 9 million as of 2014. MLOY as a company was founded in 1986 
but has history of over 60 years and now possesses a rare combination of both tech-
nological and agricultural competence. (Maatalouden Laskentakeskus Oy, 2014, 2-3).
1.2 Motivation and Background
The assigner already had a patch management policy and certain systems and guide-
lines in place to carry out the policy. Separate development, test and production envi-
ronments did exist as well. However, the process was very Windows-centric and the 
process only partially covered the growing number of Linux hosts. Linux hosts in 
MLOY were updated manually, one by one as needed. The hosts were updated di-
rectly from their distribution repository servers over the Internet. The hosts might 
not be on the same patch levels and there was no clear picture what the current 
overall Linux patch situation was. 
The primary motivator for the research was the requirement for a more streamlined 
and formal Linux patch management process by both the assigner and other techni-
cal personnel. The recent vulnerabilities with large scale and high visibility (Chapter 2)
motivated the research even further.  It was decided that the patching process should
5ideally be technically trivial to follow and give the company an insight on the current 
patch situation. 
1.3 Thesis Execution Phases
A set of requirements the resulting system should fulfill were assessed based on both
company requirements introduced later and industry best practices described in the 
second chapter. The following three different approaches to implementing a patch 
management system were experimented with:
1. a self-created automatizing solution
2. implementation with existing automatizing tools and
3. dedicated patch management software.
A test environment was built and an implementation of each patch management sys-
tem approach was carried out in the test environment. The capabilities of the imple-
mented solutions options were evaluated based on the aforementioned require-
ments as well as existing deployments and literature. The different solutions were 
then compared with each other. Based on the requirements, the most suitable solu-
tion for the MLOY environment was selected for implementation in the production 
environment. 
1.4 Objectives and Methods of the Research
The primary goal of this thesis was to review and compare different methods of im-
plementing a patch management system. The review and comparison was done in or-
6der to provide the assigning organization with a solid base for choosing and imple-
menting such a system. Based on the author's familiarity with the environments as 
well as opinions by colleagues, the system was to ideally meet at least most of the 
following requirements for its features:
1. Comprehensive: include most of the Linux hosts within the organization, both 
Debian (6, “Squeeze”; 7, “Wheezy”; 8, “Jessie”) and Red Hat (6 and 7) -based 
ones.
2. Easy to use: usable for systems administrators with little Linux know-how, for 
example by utilizing a web front-end.
3. Controllable: include a mechanism to select which patches to apply and to 
which hosts.
4. Report-friendly: include a mechanism to show which patches have been ap-
plied, which are missing and a graphical summary.
Another objective was to provide the general public with an overview of different 
patch management solutions for a small-scale, but possibly complex and heteroge-
neous Linux infrastructure. The solution was to, however, ideally scale to more com-
plex environments as well. 
The primary research problem can be described as “How to select the best patch 
management system”. Due to the broad scope and the relative vagueness of the re-
search problem, case study was selected as the research method. A case study is a 
“method used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one easily re-
searchable topic” (Shuttleworth, 2008, 1). A case study also does not attempt to find 
an ultimate truth based on bare numeric data. Instead, the focus of a case study is to 
seek a holistic understanding of the situation and to provide “new variables and 
questions for further research” (Becker, 2012). The thesis includes mostly qualitative 
7elements (verbal capability assessment) but there are to be some quantitative ones 
(calculated, score-based capability assessment)  as well. A hypothesis of the capabili-
ties of each solution was made based on literature. A real-life experiment with the 
solution was then conducted to observe how it compared to the results achieved in 
real life. 
1.5 Research Scope, Delimitation and Known Challenges
The thesis is supposed to give an overview of different patch management methods 
and offer a closer look on a few solutions. Based on time and environmental restric-
tions, the following delimitations were made:
• Since the size of the assigner's Linux infrastructure is limited, the focus will be 
on a relatively small-scale deployment.
• The solution is supposed to cover multiple operating systems, versions and ar-
chitectures: however, based on the existing assigner architecture, only Debian
6, Debian 7 and Red Hat 6  -based operating systems on Intel x86 and x86-64 
architectures are covered in the test implementation phase.
• The focus will be on systems operating on server roles, little thought will be 
given to desktop-related questions.
• Since configuration management is a wide topic of its own and there are nu-
merous quite complex solutions to implement it, the configuration manage-
ment focus will be on literature review, although one configuration manage-
ment tool will be investigated in more detail.
• The thesis focuses primarily on patching the operating system: the kernel, 
userspace tools (bash etc.) and frameworks/middleware (Tomcat, PHP, MySQL
etc.). Application patching will be given little attention. 
8• Different types of patches exist: they may provide functionality updates or 
new features as well as security updates (Nicastro, 2011, Chapter 1). The fo-
cus in this thesis is on security-related matters.
While automating a patch management process can yield substantial benefits, quite a
few challenges were recognized already before the implementation phase. The ques-
tion whether to address the following issues was postponed to the implementation 
phase:
• Change management: how to stay aware of installed software.
• How to get notified about available updates.
• How to keep track of patch levels between hosts and be certain a specific 
patch has been applied to all hosts required. 
2 Background to the Research
The constant growth of threats against information systems in recent years has lead 
to a growing need to address public security vulnerabilities throughout the organiza-
tion without delay. While it is indeed possible to update – or patch – each computer 
system individually, it is becoming more and more evident that a centralized updating
system would be a more reliable, simpler and less time consuming option. Many or-
ganizations have already deployed a patch management system for their Windows in-
frastructure. Recent threats in Linux environments at the least – such as the OpenSSL 
vulnerability Heartbleed (Codenomicon, 2014), Bash shell vulnerability Shellshock 
(NVD, 2014) and C-library vulnerability Ghost (Sarwate, 2015) - have shown that 
there is also a growing demand for similar systems for Linux environments. 
92.1 Vulnerabilities and Attack Vectors
The Heartbleed vulnerability, for instance, is a serious vulnerability in the ubiquitous 
OpenSSL cryptographic library which often provides cryptographic functions for web, 
email, VPN (Virtual Private Network) and instant messaging services. When disclosed 
in April 2014 it ended up in news headlines and created a strong pressure for the 
technical staff to address the issue without delay (Aro, 2014). What made the Heart-
bleed vulnerability particularly notorious was the fact that by exploiting it, private in-
formation – such as private cryptographic keys – could potentially be disclosed with-
out leaving a trace. This led to a massive number of SSL/TLS (Secure Sockets 
Layer/Transport Layer Security) certificates being revoked and reissued.  Another par-
ticularly nasty feature of the Heartbleed bug was that it resided in many devices that 
were not updated regularly if ever. (Codenomicon, 2014). Possible attack vectors for 
the Heartbleed vulnerability include a public Apache web server over HTTPS (Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol Secure) using vulnerable OpenSSL libraries. 
The GHOST vulnerability – named after the vulnerable gethostbyname()  function – is 
a serious vulnerability in the glibc library. Glibc is an implementation of the standard 
C library often used as a core component in Linux environments. GHOST is a buffer 
overflow vulnerability in a glibc function providing name resolution that can be trig-
gered remotely and could lead to a total system compromise. Example exploits 
against the Exim email server were quickly published after the vulnerability was dis-
closed in January 2015, followed by a ready-to-use Metasploit module. Potentially, 
any software component that can be deceived to make a DNS (Domain Name System)
resolution query by utilizing the gethostbyname() function in a vulnerable glibc instal-
lation could be used as an attack vector. Like Heartbleed, the vulnerability was ex-
tremely widespread due to the popularity of the glibc library.  (Sarwate, 2015).
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Another example is a vulnerability in the ImageMagick image manipulating library, la-
beled ImageTragick. The ImageTragick bug could allow remote code execution for in-
stance on a web forum software. Remote code execution could be triggered if a user 
is able to upload a malicious image which is then processed by the vulnerable soft-
ware component. An example of the above is a public WordPress site which allows 
public image upload and uses ImageMagick software or the PHP (PHP Hypertext Pre-
processor) extension php-imagick for image manipulation. When disclosed on May 4th
2016, only a workaround existed, as well as partial fix on the ImageMagick source 
code. Binary packages offered by numerous operating systems were still vulnerable 
with updates expected on the coming days. (Ermishkin, 2016). 
On the previous examples a patch management system – along with a patch manage-
ment process – would greatly improve the patch coverage (which platforms are al-
ready patched). A patch management system could also help in determining when a 
patch is published and how severe the addressed vulnerability is. As Nicastro (2011, 
Chapter 1) puts it, ”A comprehensive security patch management process is a funda-
mental security requirement for any organization that uses computers, networks, or 
applications for doing business today.”
2.2 Theory and Processes of Patch Management 
Soyppaua (2013, 2) defines patch managements as “the process for identifying, ac-
quiring, installing, and verifying patches for products and systems”. Patch manage-
ment is often considered a subset of configuration management and closely related 
to risk management as well. When implementing a systematic patch management 
approach, it is usually required to analyze the threat and the vulnerability that the 
patch applies to in order to be able to calculate the risk of not patching. (Voldal, 
2003, 1-2).
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Usually multiple, perhaps overlapping, mechanisms for applying patches exist. Such 
mechanisms could include the following (Soyppaua, 2013, 4):
• Self-updating software
• Operating-system level centralized update tool [such as yum (yellowdog up-
dater modified)]
• Third-party management application (such as Spacewalk)
• Network Access Control (NAC) software
• User-initiated installation or upgrade.
Developing or implementing a patch management system should most likely begin by
implementing a patch management process (Nicastro, Chapter 3). The process itself 
often defined as a flow consisting of different key stages. Nicastro (Chapter 4) sug-
gests utilizing ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library) to creating such a process. 
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In Nicastro's approach, a patch management process consists of the seven stages il-
lustrated below in Figure 1:
Figure 1. Architecture proposal (Nicastro, 2011, Chapter 3) 
White (2004, 3-5) takes quite a similar approach defining his patch management 
process in the following seven stages:
Information Gathering
White further divides the first stage, information gathering, into two sub-stages, as-
set and host management and vulnerability notification. Asset and host management 
phase includes identifying which hosts and what kind of software is running on the 
network. White suggests a continuous process of identifying these elements and a 
passive method where no agent software is required. Collected information should 
include IP (Internet Protocol) and MAC (Media Control Address) addresses and soft-
ware version information as well as server functions and running services. In order to 
be able to determine whether a patch should be installed immediately or not, sys-
tems should then be classified according to levels of importance. White suggests 
three levels: mission critical (highest, critical to business operation), business critical 
13
and operational critical (lowest, can tolerate service breaks). Similarily, Nicastro 
(Chapter 3) finds an accurate inventory of systems essential in order to implement 
different patching strategies for different kinds of systems: desktops, servers and net-
work appliances. 
In White's work (2004, 4), vulnerability notification sub-stage relates to gathering in-
formation about found vulnerabilities and released patches. The information should 
include affected software versions, seriousness rating and possible temporary work-
arounds. White suggests subscribing to relevant security announcement lists and 
public disclosure lists to achieve this information. 
In a similar fashion, Nicastro (2011, Chapter 2) suggests one of two approaches to 
tracking new patch releases: either crawling through known-good web page sources 
and subscribing to relevant mailing lists, or using a third-party service or software 
tool. If using the first option, Nicastro lists a few information sources such as United 
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) ”Technical Cyber Security 
Alerts” and ”@Risk: The Consensus Security Alert” by SANS Institute. When using the 
latter option, Nicastro suggests handing over the systems inventory to this third party
in order to receive more relevant information. In chapter 5, Nicastro points out that 
in addition to external vulnerability sources, internal ones should be used as well. 
These include information gathered from network devices, IDSs (Intrusion Detection 
Systems), firewalls and so on as a part of routine security operations. This informa-
tion could help in finding vulnerabilities as well as assessing the threat to the particu-
lar systems.
Scheduling
White (2004, 4) proposes scheduling patches in two different cycles. First, there 
should be a normal cycle to install non-critical patches e.g. monthly or whenever ser-
vice packs are released. In addition, critical patches should be installed whenever 
they are announced. Patch priority should be calculated based on criticality an-
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nounced by the vendor, availability of exploit, importance and exposure of the af-
fected systems and exposure of the affected systems. Nicastro (2011, Chapter 9) also 
suggests using static time frames for patch installation based on the severity of the 
vulnerability. In Nicastro's example a time frame for emergency-level patches could 
be within twelve hours whereas information-level patches might be left uninstalled 
altogether.
Testing
Testing should be considered critical to the patch management process and should be
done in an exact mirror of the production environment whenever possible. If this is 
not possible, the patches should first be rolled out to easily-recoverable systems. 
(White, 2004, 4-5). Nicastro (2011, chapter 8) recognizes the same issues and also 
recommends using a patch rating system to be able to concentrate on the patches 
that have the biggest effect on the organization. A virtualized test environment could 
be created as well as recommended by both White (2004, 4-5) and Nicastro (2011, 
Chapter 8).
Change Management
Change management stage includes planning for patch implementation. White (2004,
5) suggests contingency and back-out plans should first exist. Documentation about 
what is installed and how to remove it should exist, as well as backups and standby 
personnel in case of failure. Risk mitigation should be considered as well so that pos-
sible complications are limited. Plans should exist for defining what criteria must be 
met for the patch to be considered successful.
Installation
White (2004, 5) calls for a well controlled and predictable installation to limit disrup-
tion to business services. Access controls should be implemented to disallow out-of-
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band patch installation by uses or automated processes. Guidelines should be written
and checked regularly. Mission critical systems should be patched manually, during 
off-hours. Just as White, Nicastro (2011, Chapter 8) mentions the need for a well-con-
trolled implementation by the operations group as well. Nicastro pays special atten-
tion to using pre-generated step-by-step instructions in the implementation phase.
Audit and Assessment
Successful patch deployment should be verified by using e.g. agent software or vul-
nerability scanner. Reports should also be generated at this stage as well as documen-
tation about any occurred issues. The reports should be forwarded to upper manage-
ment so that they know the process is functioning as expected. In Nicastro's ap-
proach (2011, Chapter 9) a named security group generates reports and maintains 
them in a central repository or database. The documentation should include an over-
view of the vulnerability, test plan and results, implementation and back-out plans for
all systems as well as progress reports and scorecards to track patched systems.
Consistency and Compliance
White (2004, 5) explains this stage as a kind of a feedback where the lessons learned 
are used to improve the process. An audit trail is also provided in this stage. The real-
world product of this stage could be an update of images, build scripts and documen-
tation.
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2.3 Architecture of Patch Management Software
There are numerous architectural options for implementing a patch management sys-
tem. Souppaya (2013, 8), for instance, states that a patch management system con-
sists of “one or more centralized servers that provide management and reporting, 
and one or more consoles”. Souppaya lists three different methods of identifying 
missing patches (2013, 8-9): 
• agent-based, 
• agentless scanning, and 
• passive network monitoring.
In the agent-based model a separate agent software is installed on target hosts. The 
agent communicates with a separate, centralized management server. The agent is 
responsible for determining which vulnerable software is present on the host, updat-
ing it and executing any state required changes such as restarting the host. Soyppaya 
(2013, 8) recommends agent-based architecture for mobile hosts such as telecom-
muter laptops and smartphones. Souppaya finds limitations for this architecture as 
well: agents usually cannot be installed on locked appliances and agents may not be 
available for all operating systems. (Souppaya, 2013, 8-10.) 
As opposed to agent-based scanning, in agentless scanning architecture there is only 
a scanner server scanning the hosts for vulnerable software. The scanning server usu-
ally requires root level access to the hosts. On the positive side, this method does not
require agent installation. The downside is that the hosts need to be in the local net-
work. Network security devices may also block the scan attempts, and scanning 
might consume bandwidth.
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Finally, in passive network monitoring, vulnerable software is identified from network
traffic. No privileges are required on the hosts so this method could be used e.g. 
against third-party devices where the company has no access. Limitations include lim-
ited visibility (applies only to such situations when e.g. software version can be iden-
tified from the traffic it generates). This method is also only available in the local net-
work (Souppaya, 2014, 8-10.) 
White (2004, 7-8) categorizes the architectural classes in a similar fashion. White's 
Client-Server architecture is analogous to Soyppaya's (2013, 8) agent-based scanning 
and server-only  architecture closely resembles Souppaya's agentless scanning. White
also lists the use of Configuration Managers – such as IBM Tivoli – as a category of its 
own. White defines Configurations Manager category as agent-based systems where 
patch management is only a subset of their full functionality.
In addition to the above, Nicastro (Chapter 3) mentions remote user devices as an 
area to give special attention to.  While agent-based approach could be used, the 
agents and end user devices are less trusted in this scenario. As an example, the use 
of a separate, isolated network segment is suggested so that VPN connections to the 
local network are confined within the isolated segment until they are patched or oth-
erwise found eligible for full network access.
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White (2004, 8-10) also proposes an architecture of an automated, open source, 
cross platform patch management system based on his patch management process. 
White's approach is holistic aiming to provide a complete system covering detection, 
testing and deployment as well as reporting and maintenance. In White's opinion, 
the system should meet the following criteria in addition to the obvious patch instal-
lation functionalities: 
• be secure, 
• be inexpensive,
• be vendor-neutral
• have powerful feedback mechanisms
• be flexible to ensure smooth integration with e.g. IDS's (Intrusion Detection 
Systems)
• be robust and easy to use
19
White (2004, 8-10) describes a number of key elements a patch management system 
should include closely related to his patch management process. A depiction of 
White's architectural proposal is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Architecture proposal from White (2004, 2)
Vulnerability Notification
In the vulnerability notification phase a current and dynamic database of vulnerabili-
ties is required. White (2004, 8) prefers an externally maintained database due to the
high volume and broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. White proposes the Open Source 
Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) due to its size and the XML-RPC (eXtensible Markup 
Language – Remote Procedure Call) interface provided. It should however be taken 
into account that a decision to shut down OSVDB was published on April 2016 (OS-
VDB, 2016).
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Reporting
Patches need to be thoroughly tested before installing in production and processes 
for installing and removing patches need to be documented as well, which can poten-
tially be very time-consuming. White (2004, 9) proposes a systems database keeping 
track of host names, locations, IP addresses, software versions etc. White also pro-
poses using a vulnerability scanner such as Nessus to ensure patch installation.
Pulling Patches
Patches are usually not distributed from a single location, and there could be multiple
vendors, each with their own patch distribution policy. White (2004, 9) suggests a 
modular approach where a different fetching method is implemented as a plugin for 
each source.
Creating Packages
White (2004, 9) presents two different methods of package creation: replacing the 
entire binary or using binary patching. Binary patching reduces distribution time; 
however, is more likely to raise unexpected issues due to varying system configura-
tions. White suggests a separate, shared patch database – possibly maintained by an 
industry body – so that different organizations could learn from each other's patching
techniques.
Testing Packages and Stop-Gap Protection
White (2004, 9-10) explains the difficulty of automating testing and concludes that it 
will most likely be a time-consuming, manual task. During this time, the production 
systems could be protected by using IDS signatures to drop malicious traffic. White 
proposes using the vulnerability information in OSVDB to create IDS signatures as a 
long-term plan.
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Patch Distribution
White (2004, 10) states that single-server patch deployment is inefficient and prone 
to DoS (Denial of Service) attacks.  He proposes using peer-to-peer distribution in-
stead, such as Bittorrent. This would reduce bandwidth load on the distribution 
server and provide greater security.
2.4 Introduction to Linux Software Management
There are numerous different ways to install and update software in Linux environ-
ments, such as building from source code or using vendor-specific binary installers 
much alike in Windows infrastructure. The most common way, however, is to utilize 
distribution-specific package management system such as yum in Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux and its derivatives or apt (Advanced Package Tool) in Debian and its derivatives.
Package management systems handle software installation, its dependencies such as 
specific libraries and sometimes configuration as well. The package managers use bi-
nary software packages pre-compiled for the distribution. The packages in turn reside
in archives called software repositories. Multiple different repositories can be used in 
a single operating system instance, allowing the use of self-hosted repositories with 
possibly custom software.     
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3 Test Environment
3.1 Overview
A test environment was created in a VMware ESXi (Elastic Sky X integrated) virtual en-
vironment consisting of the following virtual machines:
• Manager: the patch management host
• Centosrepo: a local software repository mirror
• Centos6: a test host running CentOS 6
• Debian6: a test host running Debian 6, “Squeeze”
• Debian7: a test host running Debian 7, “Wheezy”
• Debian8:  a test host running Debian 8, “Jessie”.
Using a virtual machine environment made it possible to return to specific point in 
time configuration-wise: for example, reverting a host to a point before installing a 
specific piece of software.
 
3.2 Internal Software Repository
An internal software repository was implemented on the Centosrepo host. The pur-
pose of this repository was to
• control the updated software versions
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• be able to isolate the hosts so that they are not able to connect to the Inter-
net
• avoid bottlenecks caused by remote repositories by downloading patches 
over a fast local network and
• save bandwidth by only downloading from over the Internet once.
By implementing a local repository, it was possible to limit Internet access to the 
repository host only as depicted in Figure 3.
Figure. 3. Test network topology.
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4 Implementation Options
4.1 Self-created
The basic idea in a self-created patching system was to automatically log in to the 
hosts and utilize the existing operating system update functions, such as yum on 
CentOS (Community enterprise Operating System) hosts and apt on Debian hosts. 
Compared to the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) guide (Soup-
paya, 2013, 8-9) this method includes features from both agentless network scanning
and agent-based scanning. No distinct agent is installed, but package management 
features native to the operating system are used as an agent.
4.1.1 Preparation
Since SSH (Secure Shell) is the de facto standard way of logging on remote Linux ma-
chines and multiple simultaneous logins were required, PSSH (parallel-ssh) tool was 
chosen as the login tool. PSSH is a Python application providing parallel versions of 
OpenSSH and related tools (McNabb, 2015).  PSSH does not require a GUI (Graphical 
User Interface) and is well suited for plain shell environment. PSSH was installed on 
the Manager host by enabling the Extra Packages for Enterprise Linux (EPEL) reposi-
tory and installing PSSH from the repository.
SSH logins needed to authenticate against the remote hosts without prompting for 
credentials. A regular user 'patch' was created on all hosts. In order to avoid root lo-
gin the user was granted sudo (switch user do) permissions to run commands by 
adding the following definitions in the sudoers file:
patch   ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
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As a security best practice, the sudo permissions should be far more limited. How-
ever,  the update scripts regularly need to restart services etc. so simply allowing only
apt-get and yum commands would not be enough.
A cryptographic RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) key pair was created by using the ssh-
keygen utility. No passphrase was set in order to allow unattended authentication. 
The private key was stored on the Manager host and the public key was distributed to
authorized_keys file on the .ssh directory under 'patch' user's home directory on Cen-
tos6, Debian6 and Debian7 hosts by using the ssh-copy-id utility.   
4.1.2 Testing Patch Automation on Command Line
Parallel-SSH was used to execute update commands on hosts. First, hosts were di-
vided into groups. Groups were based on whether the exact same commands could 
be executed on members of a group. Different files were created per server groups so
that CentOS-based server Centos6 was on one group and Debian6 and Debian7 hosts 
were on another. group The syntax of the files consisted simply of the host name or 
IP (Internet Protocol) address and username as follows:
patch@172.17.1.101
patch@172.17.1.103
Unattended login for user patch was already set up, so at this point it was possible to 
run commands simultaneously on multiple hosts. PSSH usage was tested by using the
hosts file as list of target hosts and “touch testfile” as the command to be remotely 
executed. An '-i' parameter was provided for PSSH to direct STDOUT (standard out-
put) and STDERR (standard error) streams from the target hosts to the shell running 
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PSSH. Similarly, an 'ls' command was executed to verify that the touch command had 
indeed created empty files on the target hosts:
[root@Manager ~]# pssh -h debian_hosts -i touch testfile
[1] 16:58:06 [SUCCESS] patch@172.17.1.103
[2] 16:58:06 [SUCCESS] patch@172.17.1.101
[root@Manager ~]# pssh -h debian_hosts -i ls
[1] 16:58:10 [SUCCESS] patch@172.17.1.101
testfile
[2] 16:58:10 [SUCCESS] patch@172.17.1.103
testfile
4.1.3 Patch automation on CLI: an interactive approach
While creating the parallel-SSH solution, it was noticed that in certain environments 
an interactive approach might be more preferable. ClusterSSH was used for this pur-
pose. ClusterSSH is a Perl-based wrapper utilizing standard Linux tools such as ssh 
and xterm.  It is originally intended for cluster administration, however, since it essen-
tially only offers a single interface to commit commands to multiple target hosts, it 
can easily be used for other purposes as well. (Childers, 2011.)
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Since ClusterSSH requires a Graphical User Interface, it was installed on an external 
desktop host from the distribution repository. After a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) 
authentication scheme was created in a similar fashion to the previous chapter, Clus-
terSSH could already be used in its simplest form with the following command:
# clusterssh patch@debian6 patch@debian7 patch@centos6 
The command above effectively opened a control window and a terminal window per
each connected host. Since the point of clusterssh is to pass identical commands to 
multiple hosts, the hosts were grouped to ClusterSSH clusters. The division was made
per operating system so that Debian6 and Debian7 were on cluster “DebianCluster” 
and Centos6 was on “CentosCluster”. In addition, a meta-cluster “All” grouping both 
clusters was created. The clusters were defined in the ~/.clusterssh/clusters configu-
ration file in the following way:
DebianCluster=Debian6 Debian7
CentosCluster=Centos6
All=DebianCluster CentosCluster
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It was now possible to connect to Debian hosts by issuing command clusterssh -l 
patch DebianCluster or to all hosts by command clusterssh -l patch All. Commands 
could be run simultaneously on the cluster by typing into the CSSH command window
as demonstrated on Figures 4 and 5. 
Figure 4. Running apt-get on Debian cluster
Figure 5. Running uname on all clusters.
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4.1.4 Creating a Proof-of-Concept Web Interface
A simple interface was also required to allow people with little shell experience to ex-
ecute the patching commands. Since a Python environment is usually installed on 
Linux hosts and was already running on all hosts, the Python Django web framework 
was used to build a web user interface.
The Manager system was used to host the web interface. Python and the Django 
Framework were provided on CentOS 6 base and EPEL (Extra Packages for Enterprise 
Linux) repositories, however, the versions were fairly old. In order to get the more re-
cent versions, the CentOS Software Collections was used to install Python. The PIP 
(Pip Installs Python) package management system was installed as well and in turn 
used to install the latest Django framework.  The end result was Python 2.7 environ-
ment with the latest Django version 1.7.
A new Django project “Patching” was created to host the application and the new ap-
plication “PatchWeb” was created. The following  django “view” - or function – “com-
mand_view” was created in the PatchWeb application:
def command_view(request):
        output = os.popen('pssh -h /root/debian_hosts -i ls').read()
        return render(request, 'command.html', {'output': output})
The function utilizes the Python “os” library, which enables running operating system 
commands in Python applications. Here, the previously tested pssh-command was 
defined as the “output” variable and the output of the command was used as the re-
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turn value of the function. An extremely simple HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) 
template “command.html” was created to handle the output:
<html>
<h1> Output of our command:</h1>
<pre> {{ output }}</pre>
</html>
The output of the command_view function was called on line 3.
Finally, the urls.py file of the Patching project was modified so that when entering the
root URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of the application, the command_view function 
would be called:
from django.conf.urls import patterns, include, url
from django.contrib import admin
from PatchWeb.views import command_view
urlpatterns = patterns('',
    url(r'^admin/', include(admin.site.urls)),
    url(r'^$', command_view),
)
At this point there was a function to execute the required task, a handle to call the 
function and an HTML page to show the output on. To demonstrate the functionality, 
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the Django built-in web server was started to serve the application and a browser 
was pointed to the web server socket on the Manager host. As expected, the same 
PSSH command output as before was shown but this time on the browser window 
(Figure 6).
Figure 6. Initial PSSH output on browser
4.1.5 Creating the Patching Application
A patching application was created based on the proof-of-concept terminal-based 
patching scripts and web automation on previous chapters. The goal was to provide a
web interface with a possibility to view available patches per host and apply them. 
Standard operating system level update procedures were supposed to be run on dif-
ferent operating systems. Since these procedures differ per operating system, an ad-
ditional file centos_hosts – consisting of CentOS host IP addresses – was created in 
addition to the previously created debian_hosts file.  
At this point the basic idea was to run the required yum and apt commands in a simi-
lar manner to the ls command previously, simply like pssh -h debian_hosts -i apt-get 
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dist-upgrade.   As the installation was supposed to be unattended and run via an SSH 
connection, the following additional issues were, however, identified:
1. Starting the update requires user confirmation,
2. Additional user input might be required during the update,
3. sudo requires a tty (Teletype, that is, a terminal session) on CentOS hosts and 
is problematic even if provided one and
4. pssh has a default timeout of one minute so long-running update processes 
time out before completing.
To overcome the first limitation,  parameters –assume-yes (apt) and –assumeyes 
(yum) were given to the remote command to answer “yes” to all prompts. It was also 
known that dpkg, the Debian package manager, would sometimes prompt for user in-
put when a new configuration file was available.  Dpkg itself provides a way to as-
sume a certain answer. Since apt-get provides a -o switch to give instructions to the 
underlying dpkg system, the following  parameter was given to apt-get:
-o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confold"
This way old, possibly self-modified versions of configuration files would always be 
kept without asking for user input (Hertzog, 2016, Chapter 6.8).
One more user input possibility was identified on Debian hosts while updating the 
wget package: the new version release notes were printed on screen and escaping 
the notification screen required user input. This was fixed by setting the environment
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variable DEBIAN_FRONTEND as 'noninteractive' before running the apt-get command
(Hertzog, 2016, Chapter 6.8).
The third issue, sudo requiring a TTY was initially fixed by passing the SSH connection 
a pseudo-TTY with the -x '-tt' parameter. While this did fix the issue with lacking TTY, 
the following error was often seen: tcgetattr: Invalid argument. It would appear that 
this is an issue needed to be addressed with pssh (Parallel-SSH Issue Tracker, 2013,. 
issue #90). As a workaround CentOS hosts settings were changed so that login was 
done directly as user root without using sudo. 
Finally, a timeout of ten minutes was set for pssh connections with the -t switch. The 
hosts were successfully updated by issuing the following pssh commands on Manager
host:
pssh -i -t 600 -h /root/centos_hosts yum --assumeyes update # upgrade CentOS
pssh -i -t 600 -h /root/debian_hosts  sudo apt-get update #update Debian package index
pssh -i -t 600 -h /root/debian_hosts sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get 
dist-upgrade -o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confold" --assume-yes #upgrade Debian
On the web application side, the command_view function was modified so that it 
would list all available hosts by printing the hosts files:
def command_view(request):
        output = os.popen('cat /root/debian_hosts; cat /root/centos_hosts').read()
        return render(request, 'index.html', {'output': output})
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In addition, another function listUpdates was defined to run an update check. The 
purpose of this function was to run yum or apt update commands on the respective 
target machines via pssh and print the output. Parameters '-s upgrade' and 'check-up-
date' were provided for apt and yum commands in order to only simulate the update,
thus listing available updates:
def listUpdates(request):
        output = os.popen('pssh -i -h /root/centos_hosts yum check-update ; pssh -i -h 
/root/debian_hosts apt-get -s upgrade').read()
        return render(request, 'listUpdates.html', {'output': output})
Yet another function runAllUpdates was also defined to execute the actual update 
commands and use the HTML template runAllUpdates.html for displaying them: 
def runAllUpdates(request):
        output = os.popen('pssh -i -t 600 -h /root/debian_hosts  sudo apt-get update; pssh -i
-t 600 -h /root/centos_hosts yum --assumeyes update ; pssh -i -t 600 -h 
/root/debian_hosts sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get dist-upgrade -o 
Dpkg::Options::="--force-confold" --assume-yes').read()
        return render(request, 'runAllUpdates.html', {'output': output})
The Patching Django project urls.py file was modified so that requesting URL 
/runAllUpdates.html would call the runAllUpdates function:
from PatchWeb.views import runAllUpdates
…
url(r'^runAllUpdates.html$', runAllUpdates),
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A CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) file (Appendix 1) was created to simplify the web ap-
plication layout management. In order to serve this CSS file – which from the frame-
work's point of view is static content – STATIC_URL and STATICFILES_DIRS variables 
were set in the settigs.py file of the Patching project. The CSS file was created in the 
'static' directory. In the CSS file different HTML DIV elements were defined to create 
the header on top of the application web page, a menu on the left and a space for 
output on the right.
HTML templates listUpdates.html and runAllUpdates.html were created (Appendix 2) 
as well to provide links for the urls in urls.py and to display the results. A javascript 
onclick confirm function was added to the runAllUpdates link to provide a confirma-
tion window on the browser and prevent accidental updating.
The application was tested by first clicking on the 'Show available updates' link which 
displayed the result of the apt-get and yum simulation commands. Subsequently the 
'Run all updates' link was clicked which first produces a confirmation box and then af-
ter a while the output of a successful update on all hosts. The result was confirmed 
by running the check procedure again: as expected, this time no updates were listed 
as being available since all patches had already been applied. 
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The web interface is presented below.  Figure 7 presents the front page and host list-
ing. 
Figure 7. Front page with host listing.
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The confirmation dialog, along with the available updates, is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Confirmation dialog before update.
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Finally, The actual update deployment process is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Deploying updates.
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4.2 Automatizing with Configuration Management Software
Configuration management can be understood in several different ways. Jonassen 
Hass (2003, 3) describes it the following way: 
“Configuration management is unique identification, controlled storage, change con-
trol, and status reporting of selected intermediate work products, product compo-
nents, and products during the life of a system.”
The basic principles of configuration management systems include the following:
• making mass deployments easier and less time-consuming
• ensuring the configuration is identical across multiple environments.
Configuration management software offers a different approach to patch manage-
ment. Whereas dedicated patch management applications offer a targeted feature 
set for just patching and a fully custom solution provides ultimate flexibility, a config-
uration management system sits in the middle ground. All sorts of configuration man-
agement tasks can be carried out while still being able to utilize the existing building 
blocks the management suite provides. 
4.2.1 Introducing Configuration Management Systems
There are plenty of different configuration management applications for Linux sys-
tems, such as Puppet, Chef, CFEngine, SaltStack and Ansible. In the following chapters
a few of them are briefly reviewed and one is selected for closer testing to assess 
whether it is suitable for patch management as well.
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Puppet
Puppet, mainly developed by Puppet Labs, is arguably one of the oldest and most 
widely used configuration system software. Puppet comes in two flavors, the com-
mercial Puppet Enterprise and freely available Open Source Puppet (Puppet Labs, 
2016).  Written in Ruby, Puppet can be run on most operating systems, such as differ-
ent Linux distributions, BSD variants or Microsoft Windows. In a similar fashion to An-
sible, Puppet uses a state-driven approach. Puppet is typically used in a client-server 
formation where the client is running agent software. The desired state is defined on 
the server – known as the Puppetmaster – and the clients periodically contact the 
server verifying their state matches the defined state. There are multiple GUI fron-
tends available for Puppet. (Puppet Labs, 2016.) 
Chef
Chef is a configuration management and automation platform from a company with 
the same name. Like Puppet, Chef is built on Ruby and also relies on it configuration-
wise: Chef configurations – or Cookbooks – are written in Ruby. Chef is generally con-
sidered to be a more developer-oriented tool than Puppet or Ansible (Dreyfuss, 
2015) and not as easy to get started with. In a similar fashion to Puppet, it utilizes a 
client-server approach with distinct agent software installed on the client hosts.
 Ansible
According to Ansible Inc. (b)  (2016), ”Ansible is a radically simple IT automation en-
gine that automates cloud provisioning, configuration management, application de-
ployment, intra-service orchestration, and many other IT needs.” The describing char-
acteristics on Ansible are the following:
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• Agentless: Ansible only uses SSH to communicate with the target hosts
• State-driven: Ansible defines the desired end state of the target, not the 
paths to get them to this state (Ansible Inc. (c) 2016). It is, however – possi-
ble to execute ad-hoc tasks as well.
• Smooth learning curve: Includes hundreds of existing modules, the host in-
ventories are simple plaintext files and the automation language consists of 
simple YAML-formatted (YAML Ain't Markup Language) files called Play-
books.
An official graphical user interface, Ansibler Tower, is available as well as an open-
source alternative, semaphore (Kramny, 2016). Ansible is built on Python.
4.2.2 Deploying Ansible
As per the previously set thesis delimitations, only Ansible was selected as the config-
uration management tool to further test automation with. The reasons for selecting 
Ansible included the expected relative ease of use, low infrastructure requirements 
and simple set-up.
Initial Ansible setup
Ansible with its dependencies was installed by building from source via PIP. The test 
hosts were defined in Ansible hosts file /etc/ansible/hosts. Authentication using SSH 
keys was already set up in Chapter 4.1. The initial setup was tested by issuing an arbi-
trary, ad-hoc command on the test hosts:
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ansible all -u root -a '/bin/echo This command is run via Ansible'
This resulted in the following output:
debian8.patch | SUCCESS | rc=0 >> 
This command is run via Ansible
                                  
debian7.patch | SUCCESS | rc=0 >> 
This command is run via Ansible
centos6.patch | SUCCESS | rc=0 >> 
This command is run via Ansible                    
Next, the test hosts were grouped by operating system in the hosts file so that group 
names were defined in square brackets followed by group member hostnames:
[CentOS]
centos6.patch
[Debian]
debian7.patch
debian8.patch
Grouping was further tested by running an operating system specific update com-
mand on servers on both groups:
ansible CentOS -u root -a '/usr/bin/yum check-update'
ansible Debian -u root -a '/usr/bin/apt-get update'
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which resulted in a similar success message with a result listing from the package 
management software.
Testing automation via Ansible playbooks
After successfully running ad-hoc-commands, the Ansible command language was re-
viewed by creating a playbook to update the hosts. While ad-hoc commands define 
exact commands to be run on the target hosts, playbooks define a state the target 
machine is required to achieve.
A playbook is a YAML formatted file consisting of one or more plays. Plays in turn con-
tain the target hosts, remote usernames to be used and tasks to be committed. A 
task includes the core functionality of a playbook: the modules to run with their argu-
ments.  For example, the 'service' module can be used to control the state of services 
– or daemons – on the target hosts or the 'command' module could be used to exe-
cute arbitrary commands. The following simple playbook was created in order to test 
the concept:
---
 - hosts: Debian
   remote_user: root
   tasks:
    - name: install apache2
      apt: name=apache2 update_cache=yes state=latest
    - name: make sure Apache is running
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      service: name=apache2 state=running
 - hosts: CentOS
   remote_user: root
   tasks:
    - name: install httpd
      yum: name=httpd update_cache=yes state=latest
    - name: make sure Apache is running
      service: name=httpd state=running
In the playbook above, two different plays were defined to achieve the same goals on
both Debian and CentOS machines. On both plays the Apache web server is first in-
stalled and then it is verified that the service is running. Since Ansible contains built-
in core modules for managing apt and yum tools (Ansible Inc (a), 2016, apt), they 
were utilized instead of running arbitrary commands against the targets. 
In the first play, Debian host group created earlier is defined as target and the root 
user is used. Two different tasks are defined, and the installation state of the package 
apache2 is defined by using the apt module and the state of a service named 
'apache2' is defined as 'running'. Similar tasks were defined for the CentOS host 
group, only using the yum module instead of apt and substituting the apache pack-
age and service names with their CentOS equivalents, httpd. The playbook was tested
by making sure the Apache service was not installed on any of the target hosts and 
running the playbook via issuing ansible-playbook apacherunning.yml. 
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The following output was produced:
PLAY [Debian] 
************************************************************
*****  
GATHERING FACTS 
************************************************************
***  
ok: [debian7.patch] 
ok: [debian8.patch] 
TASK: [install apache2] 
*******************************************************  
changed: [debian7.patch] 
changed: [debian8.patch] 
TASK: [make sure Apache is running] 
*******************************************  
ok: [debian8.patch] 
ok: [debian7.patch] 
PLAY [CentOS] 
************************************************************
*****  
GATHERING FACTS 
************************************************************
***  
ok: [centos6.patch] 
TASK: [install httpd] 
*********************************************************  
changed: [centos6.patch] 
TASK: [make sure Apache is running] 
*******************************************  
changed: [centos6.patch] 
PLAY RECAP 
************************************************************
********  
centos6.patch              : ok=3    changed=2    unreach-
able=0    failed=0    
debian7.patch              : ok=3    changed=1    unreach-
able=0    failed=0    
debian8.patch              : ok=3    changed=1    unreach-
able=0    failed=0   
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From the listing above it can been seen that the all tasks were successfully executed 
on the three defined servers. It can also be seen that only a single change was per-
formed on Debian hosts, whereas two changes were required on the CentOS host. 
This is due to the differences between apt and yum package managers: with apt, an 
installed service is started upon installation and thus the second task was already at 
the defined state. In contrast, yum does not start the service. The defined state 'run-
ning' was not met, and a change was required with the second task as well.  Running 
the same playbook again results in a slighly different result:
PLAY RECAP 
************************************************************
********  
centos6.patch              : ok=3    changed=0    unreach-
able=0    failed=0    
debian7.patch              : ok=3    changed=0    unreach-
able=0    failed=0    
debian8.patch              : ok=3    changed=0    unreach-
able=0    failed=0   
This time the Apache service was already installed and running on all hosts. The 
state-based nature of playbooks can easily be observed from the listings above. In the
first listing the state did not match and was thus corrected whereas in the latter one 
the state was already correct and no actions were taken. After verifying the initial 
playbook functionality in the test environment, a real playbook for upgrading systems
was created.  The following task was defined for upgrading all hosts utilizing the oper-
ating-system specific package manager commands:
---
 - hosts: Debian
   remote_user: root
   tasks:
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    - name: Upgrade all packages to latest versions via apt
      apt: upgrade=dist update_cache=yes dpkg_options='force-confold,force-confdef'
 - hosts: CentOS
   remote_user: root
   tasks:
    - name: Upgrade all packages to latest versions via yum
      yum: name=* update_cache=yes state=latest
Since the Ansible apt module already contained workarounds for interactive dpkg be-
havior (as experienced in chapter 4.1.5), the relevant dpkg options force-confold and 
force-confdef could be passed to the module. This way possible interactive queries 
concerning configuration files changes were automatically answered. The playbook 
was run and all available patches were installed successfully, which was confirmed by 
checking the situation manually on each host.
Ansible GUI
After successfully running a patching process via Ansible playbooks, a graphical user 
interface was set up. An official, proprietary web interface Ansible Tower exists, de-
veloped by Ansible Inc. However, due to the open-source nature of the study, an 
open-source alternative – semaphore – was selected as the web UI (User Interface). 
Semaphore claims to include all the basic features of Ansible Tower, and in addition 
be simpler to use and have certain additional features such as the ability to run play-
books against specified hosts (Kramny, 2016). The basic idea behind semaphore is 
simple: running playbooks via a web interface. With semaphore, the playbooks are 
stored in a git repository and pulled on the semaphore host upon execution of the 
playbook. 
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Due to the environmental requirements, semaphore was set up on the Manager host 
but on a different test host instead. Semaphore was deployed as a Docker container 
as instructed in the GitHub project page (Kramny, 2016). The required MongoDB and 
Redis NoSQL databases were installed as separate containers. Since the semaphore 
container already included Ansible, the included Ansible installation was used. The 
playbooks created earlier were uploaded to an external git repository. The repository 
was  then defined in semaphore as a 'Playbook'. Since semaphore does not use the 
Ansible host definitions in /etc/ansible/hosts, the hosts were re-defined in sema-
phore in a similar fashion, as seen on Figure 10.  
Figure 10. Semaphore hosts definition.
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Next, a Job was defined in the semaphore UI. A Job consists of a single play file in the 
git repository. The same upgrade.yml and apacherunning.yml files as before were in-
troduced in semaphore as different jobs (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Ansible jobs.
Finally, the jobs were run thus creating 'tasks' in semaphore. The status of the task 
could be seen on the tasks page and the full output – the same as when running ansi-
ble-playbook on the CLI (Command Line) – could be checked via the See Output link 
as show in Figure 12.
  
  
Figure 12. Tasks view in semaphore.
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4.3 Patch Management Software
4.3.1 Introduction to Spacewalk
Spacewalk is a Linux systems management solution with the following capabilities 
(Red Hat Inc. 2015):
• Inventorying systems (e.g. installed software).
• Installing and updating software.
• Provisioning systems.
• Managing and deploying systems configuration.
Hosted and mainly developed by Red Hat Inc, Spacewalk is the open-source, up-
stream project to the commercial Red Hat Satellite product. Spacewalk acts as a soft-
ware repository of its own so a separate internal repository as created earlier imple-
mentation options was not required. Contrary to pulling updates from a repository 
such as with the self-created PatchApp tool, in Spacewalk, the updates are pushed 
from the Spacewalk server to the target hosts. Since the architecture consists of dis-
tinct agent software and a management server, Spacewalk is an example of agent-
based architecture in NIST lingo (Souppaya, 2013, 8-9).
4.3.2 Installing and Configuring Spacewalk
Spacewalk version 2.3 was installed on the Manager host in the test environment ac-
cording to the installation howto documentation (The Fedora Project, 2015, How-
ToInstall).  In addition, the spacewalk-utils package providing management scripts 
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etc. was installed. The official repositories were used and PostgreSQL was used as the
database backed and the initial setup was run. After completing the installation, the 
management web interface was up on the Manager host. 
Adding Centos hosts
Next, default source repositories were defined for Centos 6 operating system on 
x86_64 architecture. The corresponding software channels were created as well. The 
spacewalk-utils package provided a script to create both the repositories and the 
channels and to link them together:
spacewalk-common-channels -v -u <username> -p <password> -a x86_64 -k unlimited 
'centos6*' 'spacewalk23-client-centos6'
  
After creating the repositories, one of the channels - the Spacewalk client channel -  
was synced with the corresponding upstream repository on the Internet using space-
walk-repo-sync script: 
spacewalk-repo-sync --channel spacewalk23-client-centos6-x86_64
At this point there was a functional software channel on the Manager host with 
Spacewalk client packages for Centos 6 on X86_64. Next, the first managed system, 
Centos6, was added. The Spacewalk client and EPEL repositories were added on Cen-
tos6 and the following packages were installed:
rhn-client-tools rhn-check rhn-setup rhnsd m2crypto yum-rhn-plugin
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The Spacewalk server SSL certificate was installed on the host  and the client was reg-
istered on the Spacewalk server using the rhnreg_ks tool and the Centos 6 base chan-
nel activation key:
rhnreg_ks --serverUrl=https://manager.patch/XMLRPC --sslCACert=/usr/share/rhn/RHN-
ORG-TRUSTED-SSL-CERT --activationkey=centos6-x86_64
The host was now available on the Spacewalk server web UI as shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Centos host added to Spacewalk.
Adding Debian hosts
As with Centos, software channels were added for Debian hosts. The Debian reposi-
tories typically consist of two different repositories – the default one and a separate 
”security” repository and these are both divided into 'main', 'contrib' and 'non-free' 
sections. In Spacewalk a server can only enlist to a single base channel, though (Coe, 
2012). In addition, the hierarchy has only two levels, so sub-sub-channels are not 
possible. Because of these characteristics, the base channel ”Debian 8 x64” was cre-
ated to represent Debian Jessie ”main” repository. Sub-channels ”contrib”, ”non-
free”, ”security”, ”security-contrib” and ”security-non-free” were created to represent
the corresponding Debian repositories (Table 1). 
53
Table 1. Debian repository/channel relations.
Debian repository Corresponding Spacewalk channel
Debian/main Debian 8 x64 (base channel for all below)
Debian/contrib Debian 8 x64 contrib (subchannel)
Debian/non-free Debian 8 x64 non-free (subchannel)
Debian Security/main Debian 8 x64 DebSec (subchannel)
Debian Security/contrib Debian 8 x64 DebSec contrib (subchan-
nel)
Debian Security/non-free Debian 8 x64 DebSec non-free (subchan-
nel)
An activation key 1-debian8 was created for the base channel and automatically 
propagated to all its child channels as well. Since Debian is not as well supported 
within the Spacewalk environment as the Red Hat derivative distributions, it was not 
possible to populate the repositories by defining an upstream repository within 
Spacewalk itself. Instead, the channels were populated using Meier's (2013) space-
walk-debian-sync script. The script was given the Spacewalk credentials, the Space-
walk channel label and the upstream repository URL:
./spacewalk-debian-sync.pl --username admin --password 'XXX' --channel 
'debian_6_x64_lts' –url 'http://ftp.fi.debian.org/debian/dists/squeeze-lts/main/binary-
amd64/'
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Installing Perl module WWW:Mechanize and copying the Spacewalk certificate 
from /var/www/html/pub/RHN-ORG-TRUSTED-SSL-CERT to /usr/share/rhn/RHN-
ORG-TRUSTED-SSL-CERT was required to make the script work. After that, the script 
immediately began pulling packages from the defined Finnish Debian repository mir-
ror to the local host as displayed in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Populating Spacewalk repository manually
Client packages apt-transport-spacewalk and rhnsd were installed on Debian hosts to 
provide Spacewalk client capabilities. The systems were then registered to Spacewalk 
with rhnreg_ks utility using the newly created 1-debian8-key. Based on the key, the 
base channel was set automatically by rhnreg_ks, and the subchannels were added 
manually in Spacewalk administration interface. The Debian host was now success-
fully added along with the CentOS host.
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Demonstrating Spacewalk Functionality
After adding the managed hosts to Spacewalk, their status, such as missing patches 
count, could be easily perceived on the web interface as seen in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Spacewalk hosts view.
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The hosts could trivially be patched as well, either completely or by package (Figure 
16).
Figure 16. Spacewalk upgrade view.
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4.4 Comparison
The goal of comparing the implemented solutions was to determine how each solu-
tion fulfills the organization's requirements and how it compares to the best practices
in the literature. A holistic approach was taken – as befits a case study – instead of 
finding an existing comparison method. Knowledge gathered in the implementation 
phase was heavily used when determining the capabilities of each approach. In order 
to equally compare the solutions examined in previous chapters, a set of features 
were defined. The following features were conducted from the organization require-
ments described in Chapter 1.4:  
• Ease of use (emphasis on experience by people with little Linux know-how)
• Functionality (ability to perform actual update/management tasks)
• Reportability (ability to produce reports, show errata etc.)
• Maintainability (future of the solution, availability of support, ease of updat-
ing etc.)
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Based on the experiences in Chapter 4, each solution was verbally reviewed per fea-
ture (Table 2).  
Table 2. Verbal review.
MLOY PatchApp Ansible Spacewalk
Ease of Use Web app, clumsy UI Web app, feature-in-
complete UI
Web app, profes-
sional UI
Functionality OS Patching, easily 
extended to applica-
tion patching
OS patching, host 
management, easily 
extended to applica-
tion patching
OS Patching,  
Scheduling, Asset 
Inventory, Per-
package updates, 
Reportability Installed packages 
only
Installed packages 
only
Installed packages,
missing patches, 
security errata, 
host information
Maintainability Single maintainer, 
do-it-yourself, bad 
architecture
Open source com-
munity
Backed by Red 
Hat, open source 
community, paid 
support available. 
Future plans un-
known 
Emphasis factors – represented by integers – were given to different features based 
on importance of each feature in the assigner's environment. The factors were de-
fined as follows:
• Ease of use: 3
• Functionality: 3
• Reportability: 1
• Maintainability: 2
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Based on the verbal review, each solution was graded on a scale from one to ten re-
garding each of the features. The final grade was calculated by multiplying the scores 
with the corresponding factor and finally summing the points together. (Table 3).  
Table 3. Calculating the final scores.
Feature (factor) MLOY PatchApp
Score (weighed)
Ansible
Score (weighed)
Spacewalk
Score (weighed)
Ease of Use (3) 6 (18) 7 (21) 8 (24)
Functionality (3) 5 (15) 6 (18) 8 (24)
Reportability (1) 3 (3) 3 (3) 8 (8)
Maintainability (2) 5 (10) 7 (14) 8 (16)
Weighed sum of the
above
46 56 74
Based on the weighed sum, Spacewalk was found to be the recommended solution 
for the assigner's environment. 
5 Conclusions
The results achieved with each solution are discussed in more detail in the following 
chapters and conclusions are made based on the results.  The positive and negative 
aspects are weighed and the suitability for different environments by approach is re-
flected on. Final conclusions are made and the thesis process is also reflected on.
5.1 Self-Created PatchApp
It was demonstrated in Chapter 4.1 that a functional patch management implemen-
tation could indeed be put together from scratch by utilizing native operating system 
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functionality remotely over SSH and deploying a web interface on top of it. The appli-
cation does cover several of the requirements defined in the Objectives and Methods
chapter as well as those presented in literature such as in White's proposition (2004).
For instance, a web interface for simple patch deployment exists, as well as the capa-
bility to operate multiple operating systems. No distinct method of handling vulnera-
bility notifications was defined, however. The notifications should instead be handled 
by subscribing to vendor-specific and general security mailing lists as suggested by 
White (2004, 4). The “pulling patches” category in White's model (2004, 9) is obvi-
ously implemented as well, in the form of using the official distribution repositories. 
The “various sources” issue presented by White (2004, 9) is handled by using an in-
ternal repository. In contrast to White's proposal (2004, 8), most of the detection and
testing functionality is missing. While it is possible to see the situation of the current 
available updates, other than that, reporting functionality does not really exist either. 
The existing functionality is also somewhat awkward: for instance the web interface 
waits for an update command to finish before showing the results.     
There is certainly potential in the self-created approach, and since it is built from the 
ground up, there are practically no limits functionality-wise. As an agentless approach
(Souppaya, 2013, 8-9), it requires little modification on the target hosts, which is of-
ten beneficial in production environments. It could easily be extended to application 
patching, for instance. Whereas operating system upgrades are usually simple to im-
plement using native operating system tools, different third-party applications can be
quite a different thing, though. The applications have different installation and up-
date methods which may or may not integrate to the native package management 
system, which would re-introduce the mentioned White's (2004, 9) “various sources” 
issue. The installation itself can usually be scripted and such scripts are trivial to call 
on a web interface such as the one implemented here. 
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Only a limited feature set exists due to time constraints and lack of software develop-
ment skills. Some architectural choices were not too desirable, such as calling Bash 
scripts from within Python, instead of utilizing Python libraries for the same task. The 
self-created approach is also self-maintained. An organization developing an entirely 
custom solution might find maintenance resource-intensive. Even so, a custom solu-
tion might be a viable approach for heavily customized, diverse environments where 
development workforce exists within the organization.
5.2 Configuration Management Approach
Configuration management software is an established way of controlling systems and
it goes without saying that such software can be utilized for patch management as 
well, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.2. Many of the difficulties found with the self-cre-
ated solution – such as the web interface responsiveness and handling configurations
file changes were already addressed in Ansible. With Ansible it was also possible to 
control which hosts to patch via the web interface, but as with PatchApp, individual 
patches were not easily handled. Other than that, the results were somewhat similar 
to the self-created PatchApp solution. A web interface was present as well and the 
result was vendor-neutral. The solution was also agentless (Souppaya, 2013, 8-9). An-
sible, just like PatchApp, utilizes operating system tools, so the only package update 
option is replacing binaries instead of patching the compiled binaries (White 2004, 8-
9). There was little reporting functionality and no built-in security errata information. 
It should be noted, however, that most of the limitations apply to the implemented 
solution, not configuration management as a whole. 
Obviously, results with configuration management software may vary dramatically 
depending on the environment. An organization with an existing configuration man-
agement solution is likely to prefer that for patch management as well. As briefly in-
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troduced in Chapter 4.2, there are numerous different configuration management 
tools available and some of them might be more applicable for patch management.  
5.3 Spacewalk
As anticipated, Spacewalk – being a dedicated patch management tool – was the 
most streamlined solution for patch management out of the box. In addition to what 
was achieved with the other solutions, Spacewalk offered per-package management, 
scheduling and a host of reporting possibilities such as status information.  Informa-
tion gathering was also covered in the Spacewalk implementation and a systems 
database was automatically created when adding hosts, as suggested by both Nicas-
tro (2011, Chapter 2) and Souppaya (2003, 9).  System information was readily avail-
able, and the published updates could be tracked via errata information. While errata
is not available by default for the open source operating systems and errata collection
was not implemented in the example setup, implementing errata by collecting data 
from vendor announcement emails with existing scripts should be a simple task 
(Meier, 2016). Errata information could be used for classifying the vulnerabilities and 
scheduling patches based on this information as Nicastro suggests (2011, Chapter 9). 
As an agent-based system (Souppaya, 2013, 8-9) Spacewalk does require software in-
stallation on the target hosts, though, which is hardly desirable in production envi-
ronments. It is also worth mentioning that the future of Spacewalk is somewhat un-
certain. While Spacewalk is an upstream project for Red Hat Satellite 5, Satellite 6 al-
ready uses different projects as its base. Spacewalk will thus probably be abandoned 
by Red Hat in the future. Spacewalk is, however, an open source project with contrib-
utors other than Red Hat so it could well live on even without Red Hat support. (Red 
Hat Inc. 2015. Spacewalk FAQ).
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5.4 Final Conclusions
During the study it became evident that a patch management system could indeed be
implemented using any of the methods presented in Chapter 4. There hardly is a so-
lution that is best for every use case. The required functionalities, the tolerated 
amount of work and the existing environment as well as the level of operator exper-
tise should be considered when selecting an approach for patch management. All of 
the options introduced in this study include some form of a graphical user interface, 
for example. A GUI might, however not be required at all in many environments, or 
even be a hindrance. Likewise, if the company workflow is heavily dependent on con-
figuration management software, utilizing the same software for patch management 
could be the best option. Similarly if an environment consists solely of a single vendor
operating systems, a vendor-specific approach could be the simplest choice. 
Certain characteristics of each option were identified. A fully self-created solution is 
the most flexible: in its simplest form, one-liner scripts could be run from an arbitrary
host to the patched hosts requiring practically zero overhead. Obviously very complex
scenarios could be covered as well, however, this would probably require an exten-
sive amount of work. A configuration management system approach is usually very 
flexible as well since the tools are planned to answer to very different needs. The ex-
ample solution with Ansible and semaphore is actually very close to the self-imple-
tented example option. The key point when considering a configuration management
software really is whether such a software is already used or is planned to be used in 
the future. Implementing a configuration management setup solely for patch man-
agement purposes might not be worth the effort. Not surprisingly, a dedicated patch 
management software does answer the patch management requirements most 
closely with quite a small effort. However, a somewhat heavy infrastructure is re-
quired and its usefulness outside patch management is very limited.
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The research could be used as a basis on implementing a patch management system 
in any organization, but might particularly be of use in the following scenarios:
• The environment is heterogeneous, consisting of multiple operating systems. 
The solutions presented in this study can be used in most Linux systems and 
to some extent in other systems as well. Many commercial systems are more 
limited in operating system support.
• The organization is unable to invest a large sum of money. All of the solutions 
presented are fully open source, free of any licensing costs, as required by 
White (2004, 6). Personnel expenses caused by implementation should natu-
rally be considered nonetheless.
None of the options offer all of the components described in literature, such as in 
White's (2004) patch management system proposal. That was not the point either, 
since the theoretical models often handle processes as well as systems, which was 
beyond the scope of this research. All of the Whatever the selected approach is, 
some form of a patch management system can be considered a requirement to ad-
dress the threats presented by a huge number of public vulnerabilities discovered 
each month.
5.5 Reflections on the Research and Further Study
The research as a whole was rewarding, yet time-consuming since there was little 
dedicated time for just conducting the research. The research offered more experi-
ence in project management and obviously in technical details concerning the topic 
as well. Some of the topics covered by the degree programme could be utilized, such 
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as the PKI infrastructure. As a whole, however, the research did not have too much in 
common with the degree programme, which had both negative and positive effects. 
On one hand, the research was refreshingly different compared to the other studies, 
but on the other hand the programme did not give much background in conducting 
the research. The achieved results are somewhat subjective, but still have a basis  on 
literature and commissioner requirements. This is emphasized in the report and is 
also natural for a case study. 
In hindsight, a more solid timetable should have been created. The research ques-
tions should have been more clearly defined already on the beginning. A case study 
as a research method gave plenty of liberties, however, little structure for the thesis. 
In might have been beneficial to narrow the subject even more as well, for example 
by concentrating solely on configuration management. The lack of programming ex-
perience was clearly seen when conducting the from scratch -approach. Consultation 
regarding Django programming best practices would have been helpful. Some kind of 
a framework for doing the comparison could have been beneficial as well. Most simi-
lar reports, however, also develop a comparison criteria of their own.   
Further research could include a more in-depth view on some of the implementa-
tions. Configuration management could also be studied in more detail, without limit-
ing to patch management functionality. The research consisted solely of self-created 
and open-source solutions, thus commercial alternatives for patch management 
could be researched to mirror the results.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. listUpdates HTML template.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en">
  <head>
        <meta charset="UTF-8" />
        <title>MLOY Patching</title>
        <link rel="stylesheet" href="/static/PatchWeb.css" type="text/css" />
  </head>
  <body>
        <div id="header">
                <IMG src="/static/mtlk-logo.png" align=left>
                <H1> MLOY Patching app </H1>
        </div>
        <div id="menu">
                <a href="/">Front page</a> <br />
                <a href="listUpdates.html">Show available updates</a> <br />
                <a href="runAllUpdates.html" onclick="return confirm('The requested action
will be run without further confirmation! Are you sure?')" style="color:#FF0000 !im-
portant" >Run all updates</a> <br />
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                <a href="mailto:teemu@tmu.fi">Email admin</a><br />
      <br />
        </div>
        <div id="data"> <br />
                <h2 style="text-align: center;">Packages available for upgrade</h2>
                <br />
                <br /> <pre>{{ output }}</pre>
        </div>
  </body>
</html>
Appendix 2. PatchWeb css file.
html
{min-height:100%;}
body
{height:100%;}
#menu a
{
        display:block;
        width:110px;
        padding:5px 18px 5px 0;
        color:#606060;
        background:#e0e0e0;
        font-size:1.8em;
70
        font-weight:normal;
        text-decoration:none;
        letter-spacing:-2px;
}
#menu
{
        width:130px;
        height:1300px;
        margin-left:20px;
        margin-right: 20px;
        float:left;
        background-color:#EEEEEE;
}
#data
{
        overflow:auto;
        background-color:#000000;
        color:#00FF00;
}
#header
{
        width:100%;
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        height:130px;
        float:top;
        background-color:#EEEEEE;
        text-align:center;
        margin-bottom: 20px;
}
